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Abstract
The paper investigates the country receiving FDI’s optimal strategy in an op-
timal growth context. First, if the multinational enterprise has high productivity
or the entry cost is high, no domestic firm enters the new industry. Still, the
host economy’s investment stock converges to a higher steady state than that of
the closed economy. Second, if the old sector is strong enough and the domestic
firm’s productivity is high, the foreign firm will be dominated, even eliminated
by the domestic one. Third, we show that if the host country invests in R&D,
its economy may grow without bounds. In this case, FDI helps the host country
only at the first stages of its development process. We present empirical evidence
that supports our theoretical findings.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, opening-up to the global economy and attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI) are significant policy priorities in developing countries for
promoting their economic growth. The main argument is that multinational enterprises
(MNEs) would boost investment, bring new technologies, (management) skills, and
generate FDI spillovers on domestic firms. However, the effects of FDI on the host
country’s development is far from clear.
At the micro-level, MNEs are expected to generate spillovers either to their do-
mestic competitors in the same industry (horizontal spillovers) or upstream and down-
stream local firms (vertical spillovers). Concerning vertical FDI, empirical evidences
show positive spillovers from downstream FDI firms (particularly joint venture FDI
firms) to domestic input suppliers, but negative spillovers from upstream FDI firms to
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downstream domestic producers.1 Moreover, a large body of literature provides strong
evidence of mixed results concerning horizontal spillovers from FDI.23
At the macro-level, the empirical literature finds that the effect of FDI on the
host country’s economic growth is relatively weak (Carkovic and Levine, 2005). More
precisely, whether this effect is significant or not depends on local conditions such as
the host country’s human capital (Borensztein et al., 1998; Li and Liu, 2005) and the
development of local financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010).
The previous conflicting results on the effects of FDI motivate us to address fun-
damental questions: What is the optimal strategy of a country receiving FDI? How
does FDI can help the host country to escape the middle-income trap and potentially
get economic growth in the long run? Our paper aims to investigate these questions
by using both theoretical and empirical approaches. We first introduce FDI in opti-
mal growth models and use them to study the optimal allocation of the host country
receiving FDI. We then provide empirical evidence supporting our theoretical findings.
Let us briefly describe the ingredients of our optimal growth models. The host
country is assumed to be a small open economy with three goods: consumption, phys-
ical capital, and new good. These commodities are freely tradable with the rest of the
world. There are two agents (a representative consumer of the host country and an
MNE) and two production sectors (a traditional industry producing the consumption
good and a new industry fabricating the new good). Assume that only domestic firms
in the host country produce the consumption good using physical capital as the sole
input. By contrast, producing the new good requires physical capital and so-called
specific labor (or skilled labor). In the beginning, there is the sole MNE in the new sec-
tor (i.e., FDI takes place.) However, a domestic firm can enter this sector and produce
the new good only if it holds a critical level of specific labor. This threshold represents
a setup cost. By contrast, the MNE does not have to pay that fixed cost, thanks to
its parent firm’s support.4
Our main contribution is twofold. First, we explore conditions under which the
host country should (or should not) invest in the new industry where the MNE has
1For more discussions on vertical FDI spillover, see Javorcik (2004), Newman et al. (2015), Lu
et al. (2017) for the case of Lithuania, Vietnam, China, respectively, and Gorodnichenko et al. (2014)
for 17 transition countries.
2Indeed, there are negative or nil impacts of horizontal FDI on domestic firms in developing
countries as, for example, Morocco (Haddad and Harrison, 1993), Uruguay (Kokko et al., 1996),
Eastern Europe countries (Jude, 2012), Vietnam (Newman et al., 2015). By contrast, evidence of
positive horizontal spillovers from FDI in developed countries is reported in Ruane and Ugur (2005)
for Ireland, Haskel et al. (2007) for the UK, or Keller and Yeaple (2009) for the US.
3See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998); Greenaway and Gorg (2004); Crespo and Fontoura (2007) for
more complete reviews of FDI spillovers, and Meyer and Sinani (2009), Iršová and Havránek (2013)
for meta-analyses.
4Our assumption on the setup cost is in line with several studies in the literature. Indeed, Smith
(1987) and Markusen (1995) pointed out that a potential domestic firm has to pay a firm-specific
fixed cost to enter a new industry. By contrast, the MNE has a plant in its home country where it has
already invested in that specific cost. Hence, this firm does not suffer such expenditure in producing
in the host country (Smith, 1987). In another context, Fosfuri et al. (2001) indicated that a domestic
firm might access new technologies thanks to worker mobility who initially worked for the MNE. To
this end, the domestic firm has to pay a fixed cost that one interprets as an absorptive capability. In
our framework, the host country must have at least a critical number of skilled workers to set up the
production process.
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been well installed. We prove that if the host country has a low initial resource or
the setup cost is high, or the FDI spillover effect is insufficient, no domestic firm can
operate in the new industry and produce the new good regardless of its total factor
productivity (TFP hereafter). Once these necessary conditions hold, the host country
produces the new good if (and only if) the potential domestic firm in the new industry
has a high TFP. Moreover, the domestic firm can dominate and even eliminate the
MNE (in the sense that the MNE stops its production in the host country) if its TFP
is high enough. Our empirical investigation in Vietnamese manufacturing industries
(during the period 2000-2016) strongly supports our theoretical findings.
Our finding contributes to explain why horizontal FDI’s impact on domestic firms
may be insignificant or positive, as reported in empirical studies. We show that whether
this impact is positive depends not only on the local conditions (resource, human
capital, ...) but also on time. Indeed, in the beginning, there is no domestic firm that
can operate in the industry where MNE has been well installed. However, the impact
turns out to be positive after some periods. Our point about the role of timing on
domestic firms’ development is in line with empirical investigations of Merlevede et al.
(2014) and references therein. Indeed, Merlevede et al. (2014), by using firm-level data
from a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms during 1996-2005, find that the effect
of foreign entry is initially negative but will be positive for a longer time.
Our second contribution is to investigate the interplay between FDI, R&D, and
growth in an endogenous growth context. We substantiate that with the presence of
FDI spillovers and by investing in R&D, some host countries can avoid the middle-
income trap and reach a higher economic growth level. Furthermore, if local circum-
stances in terms of investment efficiency are good enough, a host developing country
can obtain unbounded growth and catch up with developed economies. It is interesting
to notice that a country may get economic growth in the long run even it does not
receive FDI. Our empirical investigation on 52 developing countries over 1996-2018 is
likely to support our theoretical results. Countries having invested in R&D seem to
exhibit higher economic growth.
Our result leads to an interesting implication: Consider a low-income country so
that the country cannot immediately invest in R&D and new technology. If the leverage
of new technology is high enough or the country has potential in R&D, the optimal
strategy of the country should be as follows:
• Stage 1: the country should train specific workers.
• Stage 2: specific workers will work for the MNE to get a favorable salary and
improve the country’s income and capital stock.
• Stage 3: once the country’s resource is high enough, it should focus on R&D to
create new technology that increases the domestic firms’ TFP. Thanks to this,
its economy may have sustainable growth in the long run.
The existing literature provides some theoretical models to study the effect of FDI
on growth. Looking back to history, Findlay (1978) attempts to study the role of
FDI in a dynamic framework by assuming that the sequences of domestic and foreign
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firms’ capital stocks are determined by a continuous time dynamical system.5 A key
insight in Findlay (1978) is his assumption of ’contagion’ effect: the level of efficiency
of domestic firms depends on (but it is lower than) that of the advanced part of the
world. Wang (1990) develops this idea by assuming that there is technology diffusion:
the host country’s human capital stock is an increasing function of the ratio of foreign
investment to domestically owned capital. By using this modeling of FDI and a two-
country model with free capital mobility and exogenous propensities to save, Wang
(1990) shows that opening to FDI has beneficial implications for the host country.
Notice that in Wang (1990), the propensity to save is fixed. Other papers considers
models with endogenous saving rate. In a continuous time model with a continuum
of varieties of capital goods,6 Borensztein et al. (1998) model FDI as the fraction of
varieties produced by foreign firms in the total varieties of products. Under specific
setups (Cobb-Douglas production and CRRA utility functions), they compute the rate
of growth in the steady state equilibrium, which is an increasing function of the fraction
of varieties produced by foreign firms in the total varieties of products. Berthélemy and
Démurger (2000) extend Borensztein et al. (1998)’s model by endogenizing the numbers
of varieties produced by domestic and foreign firms. As in Borensztein et al. (1998),
Berthélemy and Démurger (2000) focus on the steady state equilibrium and compute
the growth rate of the host country in the case of Cobb-Douglas production and CRRA
utility functions. Using a continuous time product variety-based endogenous growth,
Alfaro et al. (2010) study the role of local financial markets in enabling FDI to promote
growth through backward linkages.7 Alfaro et al. (2010) focus on the balanced growth
path and their calibration shows that an increase in FDI leads to higher growth rates
in financially developed countries compared to those observed in financially poorly
developed ones.
Our model is distinct from the above papers in two ways. First, we introduce FDI
and study its effect in infinite-horizon optimal growth frameworks. Second, we study
the global dynamics of the optimal paths and provide the qualitative analyses without
restrictions on the utility function. By the way, we are able to figure out the optimal
strategy of the host country receiving FDI.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on optimal growth with thresholds (see
Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Bruno et al., 2009; Le Van et al., 2010, 2016 among others)
and increasing returns (see Romer, 1986; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Kamihigashi and
Roy, 2007 among others). Our added value is to show the role of FDI. We point out
that FDI may partially contribute to the capital accumulation of the host country and
hence enable the country to overcome the threshold at the first stage of its development
process. However, whether a host country can obtain a sustainable growth in the long
run does not depend on FDI but local conditions (mainly its innovation capacity, and
the efficiency of its investment in R&D). In a technical point of view, our analysis is far
from trivial because of the presence of both domestic and foreign firms. For instance,
the method used in Bruno et al. (2009), Le Van et al. (2010) cannot be directly applied
5This system’s parameters include domestic and foreign firms’ technological efficiency that are
exogenous.
6For this kind of growth models, see Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991).
7In Alfaro et al. (2010), the development level of the local financial market is modeled by the
difference between the instantaneous borrowing rate and the lending rate.
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in our model (see Section 3).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces an optimal growth model
with FDI to study conditions under which the host country should invest in a new
industry. We also provide empirical evidence from Vietnamese manufacturing indus-
tries. Section 3 investigates the interplay between FDI, R&D, and economic growth
of the host country by using an endogenous growth model and a cross-country empir-
ical analysis. Section 4 conclude. The Appendix section reports technical proofs and
further information on the data used in this research.
2 FDI versus new industry in optimal growth
2.1 Benchmark model
Let us start with a benchmark model in which there is a small open economy with
three goods: a consumption, a capital, and a new goods. The consumption good is
taken as numéraire. The price (in terms of consumption good) of physical capital
is exogenous and denoted by p. In each period, there is a MNE in the considered
country (called hereafter a host country). Its produces the new good by using two
inputs: physical capital and specific labor. This sector is refereed to a new industry
(or new sector). In developing countries, this sector may be ‘Computer and Peripheral
equipment manufacturing’, ‘Electrical Equipment manufacturing’, ‘Radio, Television
and Communication equipment manufacturing, etc.
At each date t, the foreign firm (without market power) chooses Ke,t units of
physical capital and LDe,t units of specific labor in order to maximize its profit:












where pn is the exogenous price (in term of consumption good) of new good.








There is a representative agent in the host country. She decides the allocation of
resources to maximize the intertemporal welfare of the whole population. If the country
uses Kc,t+1 units of physical capital at date t, it can get AcK
α
c,t+1 units of consumption
good at date t + 1, where α ∈ (0, 1) and Ac represents the TFP.
8 Otherwise, if the
host country invests Ht+1 units of consumption good in training specific labor at date
t, there will be AhH
αh
t+1 units of specific labors at date t + 1. Specific labor works for
the MNE to get a wage wt (in term of consumption good), which is endogenous and
determined by the market clearing condition given in Definition 1 below.













subject to ct + pKc,t+1 +Ht+1 ≤ AcK
α




8For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that the depreciation rate of physical capital equals 1.
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and Kc,0, Le,0 are given. We assume that the
utility function u is in C1, strictly increasing, concave, and u′(0) = ∞.
We provide a formal definition of equilibrium.










t=0, (ct, Kt, Ht, Le,t)
∞
t=0 is a solution of the problem (P1).




e,t) is a solution of the problem (Ft).
(iii) Labor market clears: LDe,t = Le,t.
Remark 1. In the absence of the MNE, we recover the closed economy. In this case,
the problem (P1) becomes the standard Ramsey optimal growth model with the budget
constraint: ct + pKc,t+1 ≤ AcK
α
c,t ∀t. We can prove that lim
t→∞
St = Sa, where Sa is
defined by S1−αa = αβAc/p
α.
At equilibrium, we have LDe,t = Le,t > 0. Hence, the first order conditions of the
problem (Ft) imply that, for every t:










Thus, wage w depends not only on the foreign firm TFP but also on the prices of
physical capital and new good.
Denote St = pKc,t+Ht the total saving of the host country. We define the function
F (S) by:






Thus, F (S) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, smooth and satisfies Inada con-
dition F ′(0) = ∞. Moreover, given S, there is a unique pair (Kc, H) with pKc+H = St




The problem (P1) can be rewritten as follows:










subject to ct + St+1 ≤ F (St) (5)
We are now ready to state the main result in this section.
Proposition 1. Under above specifications, there is a unique equilibrium. In equilib-
rium, we have,









and St converges to Sb defined by βF
′(Sb) = 1. Moreover, Sb increases in Ac, w, Ah,
and Sb > Sa.
In a particular case where α = αh, the value Sb can be explicitly computed by:













Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 1 is likely to support a positive impact of FDI on the host economic
growth. The property Sb > Sa means that with the presence of FDI, the economy’s
investment stock converges to a steady state which is higher than that of a closed
economy. Moreover, the steady state level Sb is increasing in the TFP of domestic
firms, wage, as well as the TFP of foreign firms. It implies that the effect of FDI on
the steady state output depends on both FDI and the host country’s circumstances.
This is consistent with several empirical studies mentioned in Introduction.
2.2 Enjoying FDI or investing in a new industry?
In Section 2.1, we assume that only the MNE produces in the new sector and the host
country can enjoy the associated payroll to have higher economic growth. However, it
is interesting to investigate whether or not the host country invests in the new industry.
To this end, we suppose that the host country may create a domestic firm in the new
industry. While the problem (Ft) of MNE remains the same, the representative agent
solves the following dynamic growth problem:












subject to, for every t ≥ 0.
0 ≤ Kc,t, Kd,t, Ld,t, Le,t, Ht (8a)
ct + St+1 ≤ AcK
α
c,t + wtLe,t + pnF
d
t (Kd,t, Ld,t) (8b)










+ Spillovers(Ae, Le,t, St). (8e)




The definition of equilibrium is similar to Definition 1. The labor market clearing
condition is LDe,t = Le,t. Therefore, the wage is always given by Equation (3).
Constraints (8a-8c) are standard. Let us explain (8d) and (8e). We assume that
if the MNE uses Le,t units of specific labor, it can generate Spillovers(Ae, Le,t, St)







Spillovers(Ae, Le,t, St) units of labor being available for the domestic firm. This is
represented by (8e). We assume that FDI spillovers have the following specification:




Equation (9) means that each unit of specific labor hired by the MNE can generate BAe
1+St
units of specific labor. FDI spillovers through labor turnover occur when a domestic
firm can hire former multinational specific labor. Thus, the higher units of specific
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labor Le,t, the higher FDI spillovers. However, the latter decreases in the host country’s
development level St and increases in the MNE productivity Ae. Besides, parameter
B represents either the absorbability of specific labor or learning by doing effects.9
We assume that the domestic firm has the following production function:















This setup means that the domestic firm needs to make an initial investment to
enter the new industry. We model this investment by the fixed cost L̄ that represents a
minimum number of specific labor needed to ensure the functionality of the production
process. Once the domestic firm enters the new industry, it no longer needs to pay this
cost. By contrast, the MNE made that investment in the home country and did not
pay this cost again to produce in the host country.
2.2.1 Static analysis
Let’s firstly explore the static analysis by solving a general equilibrium model at each
date. Given S, the representative agent maximizes the following problem:



















where wage is given in Equation (3). Notice that G(S) is the national income. It is
easy to see that the function G is increasing in S. Moreover, G(S) ≥ F (S), ∀S.
Denote Yd := F
d(Kd, Ld) and Ye := F
e(Ke, Le).
Lemma 1. At optimal, we have:
(i) If BAe
1+S





αh ≤ L̄, then Yd = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The first point of Lemma 1 indicates that if FDI spillovers are high enough, all
specific labor trained by the host country will work for the foreign firm to get a high
amount of payroll. The host country can then benefit from these spillovers to create a
domestic firm in the new industry. The second point shows that when the entry cost
is high, a (poor) host country is unable to invest in the new industry.
The following result shows the role of productivity.
9Fosfuri et al. (2001) prove, through a static model, that labor turnover can be a channel of FDI
spillovers. Furthermore, the degree of such spillovers is increasing with the absorbability of domestic
firms. Evidence from Brazil supports heterogeneous impacts of spillovers through labor mobility Poole
(2013). Higher-skilled former foreign firms’ workers have a better ability to transfer information, and
so do higher-skilled incumbent workers to absorb information. However, Crespo and Fontoura (2007);
Meyer and Sinani (2009) argue that the higher the host country’s development level, the less FDI
spillovers.
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Lemma 2. Let S be given. Assume that BAe < 1 and there exists s such that AhS
αh >
Ahs
αh > L̄. There exists Ād depending on S such that for every Ad ≥ Ād, we have
Yd > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Lemma 2 implies that with low FDI spillovers (i.e., BAe < 1), the host country
still enables to invest in the new sector if its resource S is high enough (AhS
αh > L̄)
or the domestic firm is efficient enough (i.e., its TFP is high).
2.2.2 Global dynamic analysis
We now investigate the dynamic analysis of equilibrium. More precisely, we are inter-
ested in the evolution of allocations St, Kc,t, Kd,t, Ht, Le,t, Ld,t as well as the aggregate
output. First of all, we have that:
Lemma 3. The optimal path (St)t is monotonic. Moreover, (St) does not converge to
zero.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The optimal path is monotonic because the function G(·) is continuous, strictly
increasing and G(0) = 0. It cannot converge to zero because G(.) satisfies Inada’s
condition (indeed, when S is small enough, we have G(S) = F (S) and hence G′(0) =
F ′(0) = ∞).
Let us study the convergence of optimal growth paths. Define the sequence (xt)
as x0 = X0, xt+1 = F (xt), where the function F is given in (4). Denote x
∗ and S̄ be
uniquely defined by:
F (x∗) = x∗ and S̄ := max{X0, x
∗}. (12)
Notice that x∗ and S̄ depend on (i) the productivity Ac and capital elasticity α of
the consumption good sector, (ii) the efficiency of specific labor training Ah, αh, (iii)
wage w,10 but not on the TFP Ad of the potential domestic firm in the new sector.
We also observe that F (x) ≤ F (x∗) = x∗ for every x ≤ x∗ and F (x) ≤ x for every
x ≥ x∗.11 At equilibrium, it is easy to prove that St ≤ xt ≤ S̄ ∀t.
12 By consequence,
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 (middle income trap). Assume that max(BAe, 1)AhS̄
αh ≤ L̄. Then we
have Yd,t = 0 for every t. In this case, St converges to Sb ( lim
t→∞
St = Sb), where Sb is
defined in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 2 indicates that no domestic firm can be created in a new industry if:













= 1 since F is concave.
12It is obvious that St ≤ xt∀t. We prove xt ≤ S̄ ∀t by induction argument. First, we see that
x0 ≤ S̄. Second, assume that xs ≤ S̄ ∀s ≤ t. If X0 ≤ x
∗, then xt ≤ S̄ = x
∗, then xt+1 = F (xt) ≤
F (x∗) = x∗ = S̄. If X0 > x
∗, then xt ≤ S̄ = X0 and hence xt+1 = F (xt) = F (x0) ≤ x1 ≤ S̄.
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(i) The host country has a low initial endowment X0.
(ii) The consumption good sector TFP Ac is low.
(iii) The training sector has a low productivity Ah.
Interestingly, this result holds whatever the level of the TFP Ad of the potential do-
mestic firm.
The following result provides sufficient conditions under which domestic firms pro-
duce in the new industry.












b > L̄. (14)
There exists Ād > 0 such that for each Ad > Ād, there exists a date td > 1 such
that Yd,t = 0 for every t < td and Yd,td > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Let us explain conditions (13) and (14). Condition (13) means that the fixed cost L̄
is high with respect to the host country’s initial resource X0 so that the host country is
not able to produce in the new industry at the initial date. Condition (14) means that
the host country may overcome the fixed cost L̄ if the steady state Sb of the country
in the benchmark model is high enough.13
Proposition 3 indicates that under conditions (13) and (14), the country should
then invest in the new industry if (and only if) the productivity Ad of the entrant firm
is high enough.
Propositions 2 and 3 offer an explanation for the absence or insignificant impact of
horizontal FDI spillovers as reported in several empirical studies.14 Indeed, Proposi-
tions 2 and 3 indicate that if the local conditions are not sufficiently good, there is no
horizontal FDI spillovers (in the sense that no domestic firm can operate in the new
industry). However, we may have a positive spillovers after a finite period of time (in
the sense that Yd,t > 0 ∀t ≥ td in Proposition 3). Indeed, it takes time for the MNE
to improve its involvement in the host country by hiring more local employees (Le,t),
and so generating more FDI spillovers ( BAe
1+St
Le,t).
Our point about the role of time since foreign entry in the development of domestic
firms is in line with empirical investigation of Merlevede et al. (2014). Indeed, Mer-
levede et al. (2014) use firm-level data form a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms
during 1996-2005 and find that MNEs initially negatively affect local competitors’
productivity. However, the effect turns out to be permanently positive for a longer
time.
13Notice that (13) and (14) are satisfied if, for instance, BAe < 1 and AhX
αh
0 < L̄ < AhS
αh
n .
14See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998); Greenaway and Gorg (2004); Crespo and Fontoura (2007) for
more detailed reviews.
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Proposition 3 leads to an interesting implication for a low development country
having high productivity of both old sectors (Ac) and modern sectors (Ad). However,
the latter sectors are underdeveloped owing to high fixed costs. Hence, the country
optimal development strategy is the following:
- First, the country should attract both FDI and train specific workers for the
modern sectors.
- Then, those workers work for MNEs (that have located in the modern industries)
to get a high salary and high-skill knowledge (through learning by doing effects
or specific training) to improve the country’s GNP.
- Once its GNP reaches a critical threshold, the country can cover the fixed costs,
and new domestic firms can further enter the new industries.
Not only helping the host country to develop new industries, FDI also affects its
economic growth. Besides, the domestic entrant firm can even eliminate the MNE as
we state in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (growth and convergence). Assume that
BAe < 1, X0 < Sa, AhS
α
a < L̄ < AhS
α
b (15)
then there exists A∗ > 0 and t∗ > 1 such that, for each Ad > A
∗, we have:
(i) Yd,t = 0, Ye,t > 0 for every t < t




ct = c, lim
t→∞
St = Sc, lim
t→∞
Kc,t = Kc, lim
t→∞
Kd,t = Kd, lim
t→∞
Ht = H.
Moreover, Sc > Sb.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
In Proposition 4, we assume that FDI spillovers are not so high (in the sense that
BAe < 1). Condition X0 < Sa and AhS
α
a < S̄ means that in the absence of FDI, the
host country cannot invest in the new industry, regardless of the entrant firm TFP Ad.
Condition AhS
α
b > L̄ means that the steady state Sb of the economy with FDI and
without domestic firms in the new industry can cover the fixed cost.
According to Proposition 4, the country receiving FDI would invest in the new
sector if the domestic firm’s TFP in this sector is high enough. Moreover, the MNE can
be eliminated (Ye,t = 0 ∀t ≥ t
∗).15 Moreover, we obtain the convergence of allocations
in the long run. Particularly, the total savings St and the income G(St) converges to
a higher value than the values Sb and F (Sb) in the benchmark setup where only the
MNE produces in the new industry.
Proposition 4 is also related to Markusen and Venables (1999) who show that FDI
may contribute to the creation of local industrial sectors. There are two differences
between Markusen and Venables (1999) and our paper: (1) Markusen and Venables
(1999) provide a static partial equilibrium model while we consider an infinite-horizon
growth model, (2) Markusen and Venables (1999) assume that there are two imperfectly
competitive industries producing consumption and intermediate goods (multinational
and foreign firms produce consumption good) while we consider perfect competition.
15Point (i) of Proposition 4 is indeed complementary to Proposition 3 by justifying a dominance of
the domestic entrant firm on the MNE
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2.3 Case of Vietnamese manufacturing industries
This subsection aims to provide some empirical evidence from Vietnamese manufac-
turing industries. More precisely, we investigate the role of productivity in creating
and developing a new industry and how the former may affect the competition be-
tween foreign and domestic firms. In this analysis, the new sector refers to “Computer
and Peripheral equipment manufacturing”, “Electrical equipment manufacturing”, or
“Radio, Television and Communication equipment manufacturing”.
2.3.1 Data and estimation strategy
We rely on the data conducted from the Vietnamese Enterprises Survey between 2000
and 2016. It is an annual and one of the biggest surveys organized by the General
Statistics Office of Vietnam since 2000. Each wave gathers different information on the
firm characteristics and activities as tax identification, legal status, turnover, capital
stock, payroll, raw materials cost, investment, and so forth.
Note that there are a representative MNE and a potential domestic firm in the new
sector in the above framework. Since the data are at the firm level, we should create
a new database at the industrial level to make data compatible with our theoretical
framework. To this end, except for the firm TFP, we only need to sum up all related
firms (all domestic firms together, and all foreign firms together) in an industry to get
the aggregate level.
When it comes to TFP, the aggregate level is computed as a share-weighted average
of firm productivity, according to Melitz and Polanec (2015):
Ωit =
∑
sit ∗ ωit (16)
where Ωit, ωit are the aggregate and firm TFPs, respectively and sit is the market share
of firm i at time t,
∑
sit = 1. There are many potential candidates for the weight share
sit as employment shares or output market shares. Given our interest in competition
between firms, output market shares is used to compute the aggregate productivity.16
To obtain Ω ≡ (Ωit), we should firstly compute the firm TFP, ω ≡ (ωit). However,
getting such productivity can face some econometric issues because it is associated
with estimating firm production function form where biased problems can arise. In
what follows, we mention some econometric issues associated with such estimation
and provide solutions.






where Yit is the firm’s output at time t, and Kit, Lit its capital stock and number of
employees, respectively. The econometric form (in log) of this production function can
be represented as:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ωit + εit (17)
16Notice that employment shares are the most commonly used, together with the firm TFP to get
aggregate productivity in the topic of job reallocation.
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where logAit = ωit + εit and other lower cases are the logarithm form; ωit represents
an unobserved productivity shock that is observed by the firm’s owner but unknown
by the econometricians and εit, the idd (independent and identically distributed) error
terms.
One of the main issues of estimating Equation (17) is the presence of the unobserved
productivity ωit. It makes usual estimators as Fixed Effects in panel data or OLS
(Ordinary Least Square) unsuitable. To deal with this problem, Olley and Pakes (1996)
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest a semi-parametric method including two-step
estimation through which the first stage is to estimate the parameters of inputs (labor)
and the second stage is to estimate the coefficient for capital. The authors propose
using a proxy to control for unobserved productivity shock (investment in Olley and
Pakes, 1996 and materials in Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). However, It should be
noteworthy that these estimators, being relevant to control for the endogeneity bias,
represent two main limits. The first is associated with unconditional input demands
that may lead to a functional dependence problem. The second limit is related to the
error terms’ correlation at the moment.
Taking all the above issues into account, Wooldridge (2009) and Ackerberg et al.
(2015) are likely to suggest, for instance, the most proper technic to estimate the firm
production function. In this section, Equation (17) is performed by using the GMM
(Generalized Method of Moments) proposed by Wooldridge (2009).17
2.3.2 Empirical results
Using the GMM estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2009), we can first estimate the
firm’s production function and then compute its TFP. Table B1 in Appendix B.3
reports the estimated results and Table B2, descriptive statistics of interested variables
in each selected industry. We observe that over the period 200-2016, a foreign firm
is, on average, bigger and has a higher TFP than its domestic counterpart. Also, the
former has a greater production output than the latter does. Nevertheless, domestic
firms are more numerous than foreign ones. These statements hold regardless of the
considered industry.
Using the firm-level data, we compute the aggregate production and TFP for do-
mestic and foreign firms at the industrial-level. We then show the evolution of these
variables in Figures 1-3.
Figures 1-3 are likely to support our above theoretical findings. Indeed, taking
a look at the ‘Computer and Peripheral equipment manufacturing’ in Figure 1, we
state that over the period 2000-12, domestic firms’ productivity is low compared to
that of foreign competitors. As a consequence, domestic production (measured by its
value-added) remains very small. However, once its TFP becomes higher since 2013,
there is a huge increase in domestic production. Thus, these findings seem to support
our theoretical findings in Propositions 3 and 4. On the one side, the small level of
domestic production between 2000-12 and the low level of its TFP seem to match with
the statement Yd,t = 0 for t < t
∗ in Proposition 3. On the other side, the increase in
domestic production when its productivity is high since 2013 appears to connect to
the case Yd,t > 0 for t ≥ t
∗ of this position.
17Please refer to Appendix B.2 for a detailed explanation of this method.
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Figure 1: Computer and Peripheral equipment manufacturing
(a) Aggregate productivity (b) Aggregate production
Figure 2: Radio, Television, and Communication equipment
(a) Aggregate productivity (b) Aggregate production
Figure 3: Electrical equipment manufacturing
(a) Aggregate productivity (b) Aggregate production
Moreover, Figure 1 also displays a decrease and convergence to zero of foreign
production. Hence, domestic firms seem to dominate and eliminate their foreign coun-
terparts in the competition (i.e., conditions Yd,t > 0 and Ye,t = 0 in Proposition 4).
The findings in ‘Computer and Peripheral equipment manufacturing’ are likely to
14
hold in the other two industries. More precisely, Figure 2 indicates that the domestic
production in ‘Radio, Television, and Communication equipment’ remains very low
for the period 2000-12. Meanwhile, aggregate domestic productivity is also small.
However, such productivity is higher since 2013, leading to an increase in domestic
production. Moreover, the latter are so higher than the foreign production that do-
mestic firms tend to bring out their foreign competitors. Hence, these findings are what
we state in Propositions 3-4. When it comes to ‘Electrical equipment manufacturing,’
Figure 3 reports the same phenomenon: a low domestic production firstly associated
with a small TFP then a high and overtaking of the former on the foreign production.
3 FDI, R&D, and endogenous growth
Notice that in Section 2, the firm productivity is exogenous. With this assumption,
the host country can suffer a middle income trap when domestic firms have low pro-
ductivity, as mentioned in Proposition 2. This point leads to a natural question: How
a host country could avoid such a middle income trap, and get sustainable growth in
the long-run? We address this question by endogenizing the TFP of domestic firms
and studying the host country’s optimal strategy in an endogenous growth model.
While the MNE problem remains the same as in Equation (1), the host country can
invest in R&D to get a new technology, which improves the productivity of a sector.
Without loss of generality, we assume that this investment is taken place in the old














0 ≤ ct, Kc,t, Ht, Le,t, Nt (19a)







Kαc,t + wtLe,t (19b)








Indeed, the host country has three investment choices on each date. The first choice
is to use Ht units of the consumption good to train AhH
αh
t units of specific labor. The
latter works for the MNE to get a total wage of wtAhH
αh
t units of the consumption
good. The second choice is to buy Kc,t units of physical capital to produce AcK
α
c,t
units of the consumption good. The third choice is to invest in R&D to create new
technology (denoted by bNσt of technology where b represents the efficiency of the
research process) by expanding an amount of Nt units of the consumption good. The
new technology can improve the old sector’s productivity but only if the amount of
investment in R&D exceeds a critical threshold such that bNσt > x̄, where x̄ > 0
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represents a fixed cost. In this case, the productivity goes up to Ac+a(bN
σ
t − x̄) where
the parameter a indicates the efficiency or the leverage of the new technology.18
We assume that ax̄ > Ac, i.e., the fixed cost x̄ is not too low.
The definition of equilibrium is similar to Definition 1. The labor market clearing
condition is LDe,t = Le,t. By consequence, the wage is given by Equation (3).
We now analyze the properties of equilibrium. By using Equation (3), the problem
(PN) can be rewritten as follows:










subject to: ct, St ≥ 0, ct + St+1 ≤ G(St) (20)
for any t ≥ 1 and c0 + S1 ≤ X0 ≡ AcK
α
c,0 + w0Le,0, where G(S) is defined by
(GS) : G(S) ≡ max
Kc,N,H
{
g(Kc, N,H) : pKc +N +H ≤ S;Kc, N,H ≥ 0
}
(21a)







Notice that the function G(·) is continuous, strictly increasing and G(0) = 0. How-
ever, it may be non-concave and non-smooth.
3.1 Static analysis
In this subsection, given S, we study the optimization problem (GS). First, it is easy
to see that this problem has an solution. However, since the objective function is not
concave, the uniqueness of solutions may not be ensured.
We now provide some properties of solution of the problem (GS).
Lemma 4. (i) If bSσ ≤ x̄ then N = 0 for any a.





























> F (S), then N > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Point (i) of Lemma 4 indicates that if either the efficiency of the research process
or the initial resource is low or the fixed cost is high, the host country may not invest
in R&D. Besides, point (ii) implies that the country invests in R&D when a and b are
high enough (because F (S) depends neither on a nor b).
If σ + α ≥ 1 and we fix all parameters excepted S, the condition in point (ii) is
satisfied when S is high enough. It implies that the host country will invest in R&D
once it is rich enough, as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 5. There exists a unique S∗ such that: (i) G(S)− F (S) = 0 for S ≤ S∗, and
(ii) G(S) > F (S) and N > 0 for S > S∗.
Notice that b(S∗)σ − x̄ > 0. Moreover, we have G′(S) = F ′(S) if S < S∗, and
G′(S) = G′0(S) > F
′(S) if S > S∗. At S = S∗, the left derivative is F ′(S∗) and the
right derivative is G′0(S
∗).
18To introduce R&D, we can also write, for example, Ac+γ((Nt−N
∗)+)σ instead of Ac+a(bN
σ −
x̄)+. However, the main results have similar insights.
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Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Lemma 5 plays a crucial role in our analysis. It is also in line with Lemma 3 in
Bruno et al. (2009). However, notice that the method used in Bruno et al. (2009),
Le Van et al. (2010) cannot be directly applied in our model.19








G0(S) = max{g0(Kc, N,H) : pKc +N +H ≤ S;Kc, N,H ≥ 0; bN
σ ≥ x̄}
Observe that G0(S) ≤ G(S). More importantly, we have that
G(S)− F (S) = max{F (S), G0(S)} − F (S) = max{0, G0(S)− F (S)} (22)
Second, we prove that G0(S)− F (S) is strictly increasing in S. The value S
∗ is in
fact the unique solution of the equation G0(S
∗) = F (S∗).
3.2 Global dynamic analysis
In this subsection, we explore the dynamics of equilibrium. Like Lemma 3, we have
the following result.
Lemma 6. The optimal path (St)t is monotonic. Moreover, St does not converge to
zero.
We then show the middle income trap which is similar to Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 (middle income trap). If X0 ≡ AcK
α
c,0 + w0Le,0 ≤ x
∗ and b(x∗)σ ≤ x̄,
where x∗ is defined by (12), then Nt = 0 for any t. In this case, we have lim
t→∞
St = Sb.
This result indicates that when the host country has both a low initial resource
and a weak research process efficiency, it never invests in R&D (Nt = 0 for ∀t). In this
case, both investment St and the output are bounded from above. More precisely, St
converges to the same value Sb (defined in Proposition 1) as in the benchmark economy.
We now study the case under which the economy may grow without bound.
Proposition 6 (convergence and growth with increasing return to scale). Assume that
α + σ ≥ 1, αh +
1
α
≥ 2, and ax̄− Ac ≥ 0, and
βmin
(
F ′(S∗),Γ(a, b, x̄)
)
> 1 (23)



























Then, for any level of initial resource, we have lim
t→∞




















19Indeed, their method relies on the set B defined on page 291 of Bruno et al. (2009). In our model
with FDI and α 6= αh, this trick no longer works.
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Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Condition (23) ensures that the productivity of function G is high enough (in the
sense that βD+G(S) > 1 ∀S > 0, where D+G(S) is the Dini derivative of function
G). This happens if a and b are high enough because the function Γ(a, b, x̄) is strictly
increasing in a and b.
Notice that the conditions given in Proposition 6 do not depend on the initial
resource X0 ≡ AcK
α
c,0+w0Le,0 which is less than x
∗. So, our theoretical results lead to
an interesting implication: Consider a low-income country characterized by condition
bXα0 < x̄. According to Lemma 4, we haveN1 = 0, i.e., the country cannot immediately
improve the local firm TFP. Now, suppose that the leverage of new technology a is
high enough and conditions in Proposition 6 hold. In this case, the country obtains
a sustainable growth (in the sense that limt→∞ St = ∞). According to point (ii) of
Lemma 4, there is a date t0 along the optimal path such that the country should focus
on R&D from date t0 on (i.e., Nt = 0 ∀t ≤ t0 and Nt > 0 for any t > t0). Therefore,
the optimal strategy of the country should be as follows.
- First, the country should train specific workers.
- Second, specific workers will work for the MNE to improve the country’s income.
- Third, once the country’s resource is high enough, it should focus on R&D to
create new technology that increases the country’s TFP. Hence, its economy may
grow faster and converge to a high-income country.
Proposition 6 is consistent with Propositions 3, 4. The main difference is that by
investing in R&D, the economy may grow without bound (Proposition 6). In contrast,
with only FDI, the economy’s capital stock in Propositions 3 or 4 is uniformly bounded
from above.
Proposition 6 is related to the economic growth literature with increasing return to
scale (Romer, 1986; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Bruno et al., 2009; Le Van et al., 2010).
Our main contribution is to introduce and study the role of FDI in growth models.
In our model, FDI only helps the host country at the first stages of its development
process. However, the property limt→∞ St = ∞ and condition (25) indicate that in the
long run, when the host country’s resource is high enough, it should focus on domestic
investment in physical capital and R&D but not on FDI.
Remark 2. It is interesting to note that conditions in Proposition 6 can be satisfied
even if Ae = w = 0. In other words, a host country may get economic growth in the
long run even in the absence of FDI. The key factors for such growth are the efficiency
of investment in R&D (parameter b), the new technology’s leverage on the firm TFP
(parameter a), and increasing return to scale.
In the case of decreasing return to scale, the capital stock may converge to a finite
steady state, which is higher than that of an economy described in Proposition 1.
Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 7 (decreasing return to scale). Let X0 be such that X0 < Sb. Assume
that α+ σ < 1. The optimal path (St) increasingly converges to a finite value Sd ≥ Sb.
Moreover, Sd > Sb if a and b are high enough.
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Proof. See Appendix C.1.
On the relationship FDI-growth. So far, we have provided several theoretical
results, particularly Propositions 1, 4, 6, to show the role of FDI on the host country’s
economic growth. In general, the host country benefits from FDI. More importantly,
the effect of FDI on growth depends not only on the nature of FDI but, more impor-
tantly, on the circumstances of the host country (initial resources, domestic firms’ TFP,
education system, efficiency of R&D process, ...). Indeed, look back at Proposition 1,
if the host country only focuses on FDI, the steady state Sb, that is higher than the
steady state of the closed economy, is increasing in the local conditions (the domestic
TFP Ac, the efficiency of the training process Ah) and the TFP of the MNE. However,
according to Proposition 4, if the country invests in the new industry, then the steady
state Sc in this case will be higher than Sb. If the country focuses on R&D and the
local conditions are good enough, the host country may get a sustainable growth in
the long run (Proposition 6) even the country does not receive FDI.
Our point concerning the conditional impact of FDI on economic growth, our theo-
retical results is supported by several empirical studies. For instance, Borensztein et al.
(1998), Berthélemy and Démurger (2000), Li and Liu (2005) show that the higher the
host country’s human capital stock, the higher the FDI impact on economic growth.
3.3 Empirical evidence in developing countries
This subsection aims to provide empirical evidence supporting our theoretical findings
in Section 3. We are particularly interested in how R&D expenditure affects the
economic growth rate. To this end, we rely on a database of 52 developing countries
over the period 1996-2018.20 We focus on four variables: GDP per cap, PPP (constant
2017 international US$), Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF, as % of GDP), inward
FDI stock (as % of GDP), and investment in R&D (as % of GDP).21
3.3.1 Methodology
Consistently with our theoretical framework, the economic output of a country i, ex-
pressed by its GDP per cap (in log) (s), in year t can be written as:
gdpi,t = β1,iki,t + β2,ifdii,t + β3,irdi,t + µi + ǫi,t (26)
where the lower cases express the log value of GDP per cap, investment in physical
capital (as % of GDP),22 inward FDI stock (as % of GDP), rd investment in R&D (as
% of GDP), respectively, and µ represents the fixed effects.
The estimation target of Equation (26) is to study both the short-run and long-run
causalities of different covariates on GDP per cap. To this end, the dynamic fixed
effect (DFE) estimator à la Pesaran (Pesaran et al., 1999) is likely to be relevant
20According to the World Bank, developing countries include three groups of countries: Upper-
Middle income economies (those with a GNI per capita between $3,997 and $12,375), Lower-Middle in-
come economies (those with a GNI per capita between $1,026 and $3,996), and Low-income economies
(those with a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less)
21See Appendix C.2 for the descriptive statistics of interested variables and the list of countries.
22ki,t = GFCFi,t − rdi,t
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for several reasons. First, this estimator can handle the endogeneity issue associated
with a dynamic data model. Second, both short-run and long-run coefficients can be
estimated. Third, the method provides a negative error correction term (ECT), and
once it is statistically significant, there exists a long-run causality among variables.
Fourth, this estimator restricts the coefficients of the cointegrating vector, the speed
of adjustment coefficient, and the short-run coefficients to be equal across panels.
If the variables are I(1) and cointegrated, then the error term is I(0) for all i. The
associated dynamic panel specification of (26) is:
gdpi,t =λigdpi,t−1 + β10,iki,t + β11,iki,t−1 + β20,ifdii,t + β21,ifdii,t−1 (27)
+ β30,irdi,t + β31,irdi,t−1 + µi + ǫi,t
from where the error correction equation is given by:
∆gdpi,t =φi
(
gdpi,t−1 − θ0,i − θ1,iki,t−1 − θ2,ifdii,t−1 − θ3,irdi,t−1
)
(28)














and φi = −(1− λi).
In Equation (28), parameter θ0,i represents fixed-specific effects, and θ1,i, θ2,i, and
θ3,i) give the long-run dynamic effect. By contrast, β11,i, β21,i, and β31,i imply the
dynamic of short-term impacts. Lastly, φi is a coefficient of the ECT to illustrate
the speed of adjustment back to the long-term stability after a short-run vibration.
This factor furthermore should be negative and statistically significant to confirm the
existence of a long-run relationship between different covariates and GDP per cap.
3.3.2 Empirical findings
As we have discussed above, Equation (28) is performed by the DFE estimator with a
cluster on the country identification.23 The estimating results are displayed in Table
1.
23In general, the xtpmg command in Stata allows us to perform the pooled mean group, mean group,
and DFE estimators. However, the sole DFE estimator works owning to insufficient observations for
the two other methods
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Table 1: Impacts of Investment in physical capital, R&D, and FDI on GDP per cap
Full sample UMI economies LMI economies Low income economies
VARIABLES LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Speed of adjustment (ECT) -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.029** -0.059
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.041)
Investment in R&D (as % of GDP) 0.606* -0.050+ 0.605* -0.055+ 0.958 0.031 -0.235 -0.019
(0.242) (0.029) (0.246) (0.030) (1.438) (0.058) (0.669) (0.065)
Physical capital (as % of GDP) 0.029** 0.002 0.032* 0.004* 0.073 0.003 -0.004 0.004+
(0.011) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.049) (0.002) (0.026) (0.002)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.459** -0.086 0.644** -0.285*** 0.479 -0.025* 0.807 -0.161
(0.143) (0.062) (0.243) (0.052) (0.402) (0.012) (1.102) (0.161)
Constant 0.398*** 0.446*** 0.218* 0.463
(0.052) (0.066) (0.091) (0.286)
Numbers of country 52 52 31 31 15 15 6 6
N × T 681 681 457 457 166 166 58 58
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 LR: Long-run estimation, SR: Short-run estimation
UMI: Upper-Middle income LMI: Lower-Middle income
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Columns 1-2 report the short-run and long-run estimations of the full sample. The
ETC coefficient is negative and statically significant at 0.1%, confirming a long-term
relationship between variables. Take a look at the short-run estimation (column 2),
investment in R&D and FDI have a negative impact on GDP per capita while the
inverse is valid for the effect of GFCF. However, notice that only investment in R&D
matters in the short-term (at a 10% level of significance). It implies that in the short-
run period, the share of investment in R&D over GDP of a country augments by
1%, its GDP per capita would decrease by 0.05%, ceteris paribus. Very interestingly,
investment in R&D turns out to positively and significantly impact GDP per capita
in the long-term. A 1% increase in investment in R&D (as % of GDP) would improve
the GDP per capita by 0.6%. Likewise, the impacts of inward FDI stock and GFCF
on GDP per capita are positive and significant. These results are likely to support
our above theoretical findings that it takes time such that an investment in R&D has
a real impact on a country’s economic development. Also, FDI contributes to this
development but in the long-term rather than in the short-term.
To have more in-depth insights about the role of the development level and the
efficiency in investment in R&D, Equation (28) is performed by different sub-samples:
UMI (Upper-Middle income) economies, LMI (Lower-Middle income) economies, and
Low-income economies. The short-run and long-run estimations are respectively rep-
resented in columns 3-4 (UMI economies), 5-6 (LMI economies), and 7-8 (Low-income
economies) of Table 1. Yet, the long-run effect of different covariates is only significant
for UMI economies and becomes insignificant for LMI and Low-income economies. No-
tice that compared to LMI and low-income economies, UMI economies exhibit higher
investment in R&D (on average, 0.5% of GDP) while inward FDI stock is not the
highest (see Table C1 in Appendix).
These empirical results are consistent with our theoretical findings in two ways. On
the one hand, to benefit from FDI, the host country should reach some development
level. On the other hand, there would be some threshold in terms of development or
investment in R&D’s efficiency such that R&D investment has a real impact on the
economy.
4 Conclusion
We have investigated the nexus between FDI, R&D, and growth of a host country
by using infinite-horizon optimal growth models. According to our results, the very
question does not rely on whether or not developing countries should attract inward
FDI, but instead on how they implement policies to benefit from FDI spillovers. We
have proved that FDI can act as a catalyst, helping a host developing country to avoid
a middle income trap and potentially attain a higher growth rate. However, to reach




A The optimal growth theory: a preliminary
For a pedagogical purpose, we present general results showing the property of optimal growth
paths in models without the concavity of production functions. Although there is a vast
literature on the optimal growth theory, some results in this section are new, and they are
used in the present paper.24
We now introduce a formal optimal growth model. There is one agent who maximizes
her intertemporal












subject to: ct + St+1 ≤ f(St), ct, St+1 ≥ 0, (A.2)
where S0 is given. For short, we write (xt) instead of (xt)
∞
t=0, where xt is a vector.
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A path (ct, St) is feasible if it satisfies (A.2) for every t. A capital path (St) is feasible if
there exists a consumption path (ct) such that (ct, St) is a feasible path. A path (ct, St) (or
capital path (St)) is from S if S0 = S.
A path (ct, St) is optimal from S if it solves problem (P ) with S0 = S. A path (ct, St)
(resp. capital path (St)) is stationary if ct = c and St = S for every t. A pair (c, S) is a
steady state if the stationary path (ct, St) with ct = c and St = S is optimal. A capital stock
S ≥ 0 is a steady state if (c,S) is a steady state for some c ≥ 0.
We require standard assumptions which are maintained throughout this paper.
Assumption (H1): u is in C1, strictly increasing and concave and u′(0) = ∞.
Assumption (H2): f is strictly increasing and f(0) ≥ 0.26
Assumption (H3):For every S > 0, there exists a feasible path (ct, St) from S such that
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) > −∞. We also have
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(f t(S)) < ∞, where f t is defined by f1 =
f, f t+1 = f(f t).
The last assumption require that the utility function is well defined and finite.
Let denote v(S0) be the value function of the problem (P). We have the Bellman equation
v(S0) = max
0≤S≤f(S0)
{u(f(S0)−S)+βv(S)}. By using this Bellman equation and the argument
in Amir (1996), we obtain that:
Lemma 7. Every optimal capital path is monotonic. By consequence, if an optimal path is
bounded from above, then it converges.
Following Kamihigashi and Roy (2007), we have Euler condition in the form of inequality
24Let us mention some papers which are very closed to ours. Dechert and Nishimura (1983) give a
complete characterization of optimal growth paths in a model with convex-concave technologies. Hung
et al. (2009) studies an optimal growth model where the aggregate production function is maximum of
concave technologies. Majumdar and Mitra (1982), Kamihigashi and Roy (2007) study non-smooth,
non-convex models. Jones and Manuelli (1990) work with increasing return to scale technologies.
25Some studies replace constraint St+1 ≥ 0 by St+1 ≥ r(St). The reader is referred to Kamihigashi
and Roy (2007), Dimaria et al. (2002), Chapter 5 of Le Van and Dana (2003) for discrete time model,
and Romer (1986) for continuous time model.
26When f(0) = 0, the function f(S) can be interpreted as a gross return of investment S. However,
in general, f(S) can contain initial endowment and/or gross interest rate. This setting is general
enough to cover concave-convex or convex-concave production functions. It will also be useful when
we consider a non-differentiable function, for example, a function in which there is a threshold.
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c′s = cs ∀s ∈ {t, t+ 1}, S
′
s = Ss ∀s 6= t+ 1 (A.4)
c′t = ct − ǫ, S
′
t+1 = St+1 + ǫ (A.5)
c′t+1 = ct+1 + f(St+1 + ǫ)− f(St+1). (A.6)
For ǫ > 0 small enough, the path (c′s, S
′
s) is feasible. Therefore,
u(ct − ǫ) + βu(ct+1 + f(St+1 + ǫ)− f(St+1)) ≤ u(ct) + βu(ct+1).
Let ǫ tend to 0, we obtain the right inequality of (A.3). By using the similar argument, we
can prove the left inequality of (A.3).
Corollary 1. If S > 0 is a steady state, then we have βD−f(S) ≥ 1 ≥ βD+f(S).
Let us start our exposition with the following result which provides a condition under
which the optimal capital path cannot converge to zero. The idea is that if productivity is
high enough at original, then we will produce.
Proposition A 1. Assume that there exists x > 0 such that βD+f(S) > 1 for every 0 ≤
S ≤ x, then no optimal capital path converges to zero.
Proof. Since u′(0) = ∞, we have ct > 0 for every t, and so is St. By Euler inequality, we get
that u′(ct) > βu
′(ct+1)D
+f(St+1). According budget constraint, we have lim
t→+∞
ct = f(0).
Case 1: f(0) = 0. We have lim
t→+∞
ct = 0. Since lim
t→+∞
St = 0, there exists t0 such that
βD+f(St+1) > 1 for every t ≥ t0. Consequently, ct ≤ ct+1 for every t ≥ t0. Contradiction to
the fact that lim
t→+∞
ct = 0.








Proposition A 2. Assume that there exists x0 ≥ x1 > 0 and a function g : R
+ → R+
strictly increasing such that
(i) f(x) ≤ g(x) for every x ≤ x0.
(ii) x ≤ g(x) ≤ g(x1) = x1 for every x ≤ x1, and g(x) ≤ x for every x ≥ x1.
We have every optimal growth from S0 ≤ x1 is bounded above by x1.
Proof. We have c0+S1 ≤ f(S0) ≤ f(x1) ≤ G(x1) = x1. Thus, S1 ≤ x1 and f(S1) ≤ f(x1) ≤
x1. By induction argument, we get f(St) ≤ x1 for every t.
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The intuition of Proposition 2 is the following: If the return function f is dominated by a
function g with which the optimal path is bounded above, then the optimal path associated
with function f is also bounded above. When f(x) = g(x) = Axα + (1 − δ)x, with δ is the
depreciation rate, A > 0 is TFP, α ∈ (0, 1), we recover the standard Ramsey model.
Proposition 2 also complements Proposition 4.1 in Kamihigashi and Roy (2007) because
our result covers the following function while Proposition 4.1 in Kamihigashi and Roy (2007)
does not: f(x) = Axα, if x ≤ a and = (A + x − a)xα if x ≥ a where A > 0, a ≥ 0 and
α ∈ (0, 1).
We end this section by presenting a condition for unbounded growth with arbitrary initial
capital stock S0. This result is a consequence of Proposition 4.6 in Kamihigashi and Roy
(2007).
Proposition A 3. Assume that βD+f(x) > 1 for every x > 0. Then every optimal capital
path goes to infinity.
B Appendix for Section 2
B.1 Theoretical framework
Proof of Proposition 1. The problem (P1) can be rewritten as follows











subject to ct + St+1 ≤ F (St), ct, St+1 ≥ 0, (B.1)
where S0 is given and the function F is defined by




c + wLe subject to: pKc +H ≤ S,Le ≤ AhH
αh .
We see that F is continuous, strictly increasing (notice that if α = αh, then F (S) = AS
α).
According to Lemma 7, St is monotonic. Since α < 1 and αh < 1, we can prove that St
is bounded from above. Hence, as in the standard Ramsey model, there exists the limit
lim
t→∞
St ≡ Sb. We now check that Sb > Sa. Indeed, we have βF




pα . It is
easy to prove that F ′(X) > αAcX
α−1
pα ∀X > 0. So, Sb > Sa.
Proof of Lemma 1. Point 1. Assume that BAe1+S > 1. If Le < AhH
αh , then consider
L′e = Le+ǫ such that L
′
e < AhH







d > Ld, L
′
e > Le




e, H) strictly dominates the allocation (Kc,Kd, Ld, Le, H),
a contradiction!
Point 2. If BAe1+S ≤ 1, we have Ld ≤ AhH
αh ≤ AhS
αh ≤ L̄. By consequence, Yd = 0.
If BAe1+S ≥ 1, we have
Ld ≤ AhH


















This implies that Yd = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 2. First, we claim that there exists a threshold A1 such that Yd > 0 for
every Ad > A1. Indeed, when Yd = 0, G(S) does not depend on Ad. Take s < S such
that Ahs
αh > L̄. Since Ahs
αh > L̄, we can choose H < s < S such that AhH
αh > L̄ and
Kd = (s −H)/p. Then we choose Ld = AhH
αh and hence Ld > L̄. With these choices, we
can see that G(S) tends continuously to infinity when Ad tends to infinity. This contradicts
the optimality of allocation.









Denote λ, λ1, λ2, λl Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (11b), (11c), (11d), and
Le ≥ 0 respectively. We have
Kc : αAcK
α−1
c = λp (B.3)
Kd : αdpnAdK
αd−1
d (Ld − L̄)
1−αd = λp (B.4)
Ld : (1− αd)pnAdK
αd
d (Ld − L̄)
−αd = λ2 (B.5)
H : λ = (λ1 + λ2)αhAhH
αh−1 (B.6)









































































Condition (B.7) implies that w ≥ (λ1 + λ2)(1−
BAe



























. Notice that Ā does not depend on S.
If we choose Ad ≥ max(A1, Ā), then L̄ < Ld ≤ AhH
α ≤ AhH̄
α, a contradiction. As a
result, Ye = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 3. One can see that the function G(·) is continuous, strictly increasing
and G(0) = 0. Hence, according to Lemma 7 in Appendix A, the optimal path (St)t is
monotonic. Moreover, since G(·) satisfies conditions in Proposition A1 in Appendix A, St
does not converge to zero.
Proof of Proposition 2. We assume that max(BAe, 1)AhS̄
αh ≤ L̄.








t ≤ max(BAe, 1)AhS
αh
t
Recall that St ≤ xt ≤ S̄ ∀t. So, we have Ld,t ≤ max(BAe, 1)AhS̄
α ≤ L̄ ∀t. Therefore,
Yd,t = 0 ∀t.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume that Yd,t = 0 for every t, the welfare of the country W
does not depend on Ad and we have that lim
t→∞



















αh > L̄. Let Ad be high enough, the new welfare of the country (with
this allocation) will be higher than W . This violates the optimality of the country’s choice.
If BAe
1+S̄t









t . Choose H
′






αh > L̄. Let Ad be high enough, the new welfare of the country will
be higher than W . This violates the optimality of the country’s choice.
The above arguments imply that there is a date t0 such that Yd,t0 > 0. Then td will be
determined by td = inf{t0 : Yd,t0 > 0}.






Proof of Proposition 4. Under condition (15), assumptions in Proposition 3 are satisfied.
Therefore, there exist A1 and t1 such that Yd,t1 > 0. As a result, for every t > t1, we have





According to Lemma 2, we can choose A∗ > A1 such that Yd,t > 0, Ye,t = 0 for every Ad ≥ A
∗.
The timing t∗ is then determined by t∗ = t1 + 1.











subject to ct + St+1 ≤ F1(St) (B.8)








αh)1−αd : p(Kc +Kd) +H ≤ S;Kc,Kd, H ≥ 0
}
It is easy to see that F1(S) is continuous, strictly increasing, and it is dominated by a
decreasing return to scale function. According to Proposition A2, the sequence St is bounded
from above. Moreover, Lemma 7 and the assumption X0 < Sa imply that St is increasing in t.
Hence, the sequence St converges and so do (ct,Kc,t,Kd,t, Ht). Denote Sc ≡ limt→∞ St = Sc.
We can choose Ad high enough such that F
′
1(x)−F
′(x) > 0 for any x in an interval con-
taining Sc and Sb (note that F
′
1(x)−F
′(x) may be negative for some x > 0). By consequence,
we obtain Sc > Sb at the steady state.
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B.2 TFP estimation’s methodology
We use the GMM estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2009) to estimate the firm’s TFP.
According to the author, materials (also called intermediate inputs) are used as a proxy to
control for unobserved productivity shocks. Hence, productivity ωit can be represented as:
ωit = ω(kit,mit) (B.9)
where mit is intermediate inputs.
At the beginning, assume that
E (εit | lit, kit,mit) = 0 t = 1, . . . , T (B.10)
then we have the following regression function:
E (yit | lit, kit,mit) = β0 + βllit + βkkit + ω(kit,mit) = βllit + f(kit,mit) (B.11)
where f(kit,mit) = β0 + βkkit + ω(kit,mit).
The estimation procedure takes place in two stages. The first is to estimate parameter
βl and the second βk. To identify βl, we need three assumptions. The first is on εit:
E (εit | lit, kit,mit, lit−1, kit−1,mit−1, . . . , li1, ki1,mi1) = 0 t = 1, . . . , T
The second assumption is to restrict the dynamic in the productivity process:
E (ωit | ωit−1, . . . , ωi1) = E (ωit | ωit−1) t = 2, . . . , T
The third assumption is that kit is uncorrelated with the productivity shock (τ) defined
as follows:
τit = ωit − E (ωit | ωit−1)
In the second stage, the conditional expectation applied to find βk depends upon (kit−1,mit−1).
Therefore, τit must be uncorrelated with (kit−1,mit−1) and then a sufficient condition could
be formulated as:
E (ωit | lit, kit,mit, lit−1, kit−1,mit−1, . . . , li1, ki1,mi1) = E (ωit | ωit−1) = f [ω (kit−1,mit−1)]
Notice that components of lit are allowed to be associated with τit. Then the production
function can be driven as:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + f [ω (kit−1,mit−1)] + τit + εit
Hence, to find βk and βl, two functions are derived:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + ω (kit,mit) + εit ∀t = 1, . . . , T
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + f [ω (kit−1,mit−1)] + uit ∀t = 2, . . . , T
where uit ≡ τit + εit. The orthogonal conditions are stated as:
E (uit | kit, lit−1, kit−1,mit−1, . . . , li1, ki1,mi1) = 0 t = 2, . . . , T
Estimating βk and βl requires investigating the unknown function f(.) and ω(.) and
Wooldridge (2009) proposes that:
ω (kit,mit) = γ0 + c (kit,mit) γ
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and f(.) can be approximately explained by a polynomial in ω
f(ω) = ρ0 + ρ1ω + · · · ρnω
n
from where the production function can be rewritten as:
yit = ζ0 + βkkit + βllit + citγ + εit t = 1, . . . , T (B.12)
and
yit = α0 + βkkit + βllit + ρ1(ci1γ) + · · · ρn(cit−1γ)
n + uit t = 2, . . . , T (B.13)
where ζ0 = β0 + γ0 and α0 = ζ0 + ρ0.
According to Wooldridge (2009), the GMM is performed to estimate Regressions (B.12)-
(B.13). Once βk and βl are estimated, the firm’s TFP (in log) is obtained by:
ωit = yit − βkkit − βllit (B.14)
from where we can obtain the aggregate productivity given in Equation (16).
B.3 Case of Vietnamese manufacturing industries: Estima-
tion results
Table B1: Estimation of the firm production function
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES lnva lnva lnva
lnl 0.658*** 0.610*** 0.645***
(0.065) (0.014) (0.018)
lnk 0.316*** 0.402*** 0.400***
(0.079) (0.023) (0.037)
Observations 213 4,689 2,774
Number of groups 218 2,547 1,683
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
(1) Computer and Peripheral equipment manufacturing
(2) Electrical equipment manufacturing
(3) Radio, television and communication equipment manufacturing
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Table B2: Descriptive statistics at the firm level
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Computer and Peripheral equipment manufacturing
Full sample
Added-value (in log) 6.77 2.94 -0.904 13.71
Physical capital (in log) 8.59 2.67 4.13 14.69
Labor (in log) 4.00 2.38 0 10.06
TFP 1.42 0.98 - 3.64 4.51
Number of observations 453
Domestic firms
Added-value (in log) 5.87 2.48 -0.904 13.36
Physical capital (in log) 7.72 2.22 4.12 14.67
Labor (in log) 3.26 1.998 0 10.04
TFP 1.28 0.91 -3.64 4.51
Number of observations 342
Foreign firms
Added-value (in log) 9.53 2.49 1.99 13.71
Physical capital (in log) 11.27 2.10 6.35 14.69
Labor (in log) 6.27 1.99 0.69 10.06
TFP 1.84 1.08 -2.32 3.82
Number of observations 111
Electrical equipment manufacturing
Full sample
Added-value (in log) 6.14 2.29 -3.23 13.12
Physical capital (in log) 8.31 2.05 -1.51 14.03
Labor (in log) 3.52 1.67 0 9.33
TFP 0.64 0.98 - 5.87 4.29
Number of observations 7,854
Domestic firms
Added-value (in log) 5.79 2.18 -3.23 13.11
Physical capital (in log) 7.96 1.97 -1.51 14.02
Labor (in log) 3.29 1.57 0 9.33
TFP 0.59 0.96 -5.81 4.12
Number of observations 6,033
Foreign firms
Added-value (in log) 7.29 2.26 -0.395 12.57
Physical capital (in log) 9.46 1.86 4.31 13.42
Labor (in log) 4.35 1.75 0 9.104
TFP 0.83 1.03 -5.87 4.29
Number of observations 1,821
Radio, television and communication equipment manufacturing
Full sample
Added-value (in log) 6.92 2.53 -1.63 16.5
Physical capital (in log) 8.61 2.27 -0.53 17.30
Labor (in log) 4.27 1.91 0 11.07
TFP 0.73 1.03 - 7.33 4.53
Number of observations 4,759
Domestic firms
Added-value (in log) 6.58 2.51 -1.63 16.50
Physical capital (in log) 8.24 2.24 -0.53 17.30
Labor (in log) 4.02 1.89 0 11.07
TFP 0.69 1.01 -7.34 4.53
Number of observations 3,616
Foreign firms
Added-value (in log) 8.05 2.24 -0.92 15.34
Physical capital (in log) 9.81 1.90 4.75 16.47
Labor (in log) 5.08 1.74 0 10.24
TFP 0.85 1.07 -5.94 3.29
Number of observations 1,143
30
C Appendix for Section 3
C.1 Theoretical framework
Proof of Lemma 4. Let x := bSσ − x̄. Since x > 0, there exists αn ∈ (0, 1) such that
bSσασn = x̄. Define Kc, N,H by
N = (αn + ǫ)S, pKc = ǫS, H = 0 (C.1)













With such N,Kc, we have bN


































































g(Kc, N,H) is increasing in a and b. It will be higher than F (S) when a and b are high
enough because F (S) does not depend on (a, b).
Proof of Lemma 5. We need an intermediate step.
Claim 1. Assume that ax̄ > Ac. Denote N















Kαc : Kc, N ≥ 0, pKc +N ≤ x, bN
σ ≥ x̄}.
We have that x∗ ≥ N∗. The function G1 is well-defined on the interval [N
∗,∞). On






α/pα is strictly increasing in x and there exists a unique x∗ such that G1(x
∗) =
Ac(x
∗)α/pα. Moreover, b(x∗)σ − x̄ > 0.
Proof of Claim 1. If x ≤ N∗, then G1(x) = 0.
Consider the case x > N∗. Let (Kc, N) be an optimal point. It is clear that Kc > 0 and
N < x.
If N ≤ N∗, then N = N∗, G1(x) = Ac(x−N
∗)α/pα and G2(x) = Acx
α/pα.
If N ∈ (N∗, x) at optimal, we write FOCs



















− αab = 0. (C.7)
The left hand side (LHS) is strictly decreasing in N because ax̄−Ac > 0. When N = x, the
LHS equals α(ax̄−Ac)xσ − αab < 0 because x > N









Observe that LHS(N∗) ≥ 0 if and only if
















Therefore, we get that:
1. If x ≤ x∗, then N = N∗ and G1(x) = Ac(x−N








because N∗ > 0 and α− 1 < 0.
2. If x > x∗, then the equation (C.7) has a unique Nx in the interval (N
∗, x). The optimal
point (Kc, N) is given by N = Nx and pKc +N = S. Moreover, when x increases, we









Kαc where N is uniquely given by (C.7) and










because bNσ − x̄ > 0 and pKc < S.
3. When x tends to x∗, we have Nx tends to N



















αh : x+H ≤ S;x,H ≥ 0
}
. (C.10)
Let (xg, Hg) be an optimal point. Since G1 is differentiable, we have the FOC
G′1(xg)− αhwAh(S − xg)
αh−1 = 0.




αh = F (S). Then, we have
αAxα−1




pα , we have 0 >
αA(xg)α−1
pα − αhwAh(S − xg)
αh−1. Therefore, we







So, G0(S)− F (S) is strictly increasing.
When S is small enough, G0(S)−F (S) is negative. When S is high enough, G0(S)−F (S)
is positive (see, for example, point (ii) of Lemma 4). So, there exists a unique S∗ such that
G0(S
∗)− F (S∗) = 0.
According to (22) and G(S) ≥ G0(S) ∀S, we have G(S) − F (S) = 0 ∀S ≤ S
∗, and
G(S)− F (S) > 0 ∀S > S∗.
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Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. We will prove, by
induction argument, that bx̄σt ≤ x̄ and St ≤ x
∗ ∀t ≥ 1.
When t = 1. We have N1 ≤ S1 ≤ X0 ≤ x
∗, So, bNσ1 ≤ bS̄
σ
t ≤ x̄.
Assume that bx̄σt ≤ x̄ and St ≤ x
∗ ∀t ≤ T . This implies that NT = 0, because otherwise
we can reduce NT and augment Kc,T in order to get a higher utility, which is a contradiction.
Since NT = 0, we have that G(ST ) = F (ST ). Since ST ≤ x
∗, we have F (ST ) ≤ F (x
∗) =
x∗.
Hence, ST+1 ≤ G(ST ) ≤ x
∗ and therefore bx̄σT+1 ≤ bS
σ
T+1 ≤ b(x
∗)σ ≤ x̄. We have finished
our proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. We need intermediate steps.
Lemma 9. Assume that α + σ ≥ 1. For any solution Kc, N,H of the problem (GS), there













θh = 0. (C.12)
Proof of Lemma 9. Observe that, when S is high enough, we have bNσ−x̄ > 0 at optimal.
It is also to see that θc, θh > 0. By consequence, we can write FOCs for the problem (G
′) as
follows (we have FOCs even the objective function is not concave):
αhwAhS

































α = abσSσθσ−1n θc. (C.17)


















From this, we get limS→∞(
σθc
αθn
− 1)θσn = 0. By combining this with the fact that σ ≤ 1, we
obtain limS→∞(θc −
α
σ θn) = 0.
Notice that b(Sθn)
σ > N for S high enough.
We will prove that when S tends to infinity, Sθh is bounded from above, and hence
limS→∞ θh = 0. To do so, we firstly prove that lim infS→∞
(Sθc)α
(Sθn)1−σ
> 0. Indeed, according





















































is bounded away from zero (because α+ σ ≥ 1), a contradiction.
So, we get that lim infS→∞
(Sθc)α
(Sθn)1−σ
> 0. By combining this with (C.16), we have that
Sθh is bounded from above and hence limS→∞ θh = 0. Combining with (C.18), we obtain
(C.12).
Lemma 10. Assume that ax̄−Ac ≥ 0. We have






F ′(S∗),Γ(a, b, x̄)
)
(C.22)

























By consequence, when a and b are high enough and αh +
1
α ≥ 2, we have βD
+G(S) > 1
∀S > 0.
Proof. Part 1. We prove (C.22). Let S > S∗. Consider the function











subject to: pKc +N +H ≤ S, bN
σ ≥ x̄ and Kc, N,H ≥ 0. (C.24b)
When S > S∗, we have G(S) = G0(S) and bN
σ > x̄ at optimal. We will quantify G′0(S).
Let λ be the multiplier associated to the constraint pKc +N +H ≤ S, we have FOCs
(abNσ − (ax̄−Ac))αK
α−1
c = pλ (C.25)
abσNσ−1Kαc = λ (C.26)
αhwAhH
αh−1 = λ. (C.27)

















because ax̄−Ac ≥ 0 and bN
σ ≥ x̄.




























































Since S = N + pKc +H, we have












































Denote d ≡ ax̄−Ac ≥ 0. We have
G0(S) = (abN
σ − d)Kαc + wAhH
αh
G′0(S) = (abN







because pK ′c(S) +N
′(S) +H ′(S) = 1.
By combining this with Kc ≥
αAc

























































≡ Γ(a, b, x̄) (C.38)
At point S∗, the right Dini derivative of G is






F (S∗ + ǫ)− F (S∗)
ǫ
= F ′(S∗). (C.39)
When S < S∗, we have G(S) = F (S) and hence G′(S) = F ′(S) ≥ F ′(S∗) because F ′ is
decreasing.
Part 2. We prove that, when a and b are high enough and αh +
1
α ≥ 2, we have
βD+G(S) > 1 ∀S > 0.
Observe that Γ(a, b, x̄) is increasing in a and βΓ(a, b, x̄) > 1 when a is high enough.
When αh+
1





≥ 0 and therefore Γ(a, b, x̄) is strictly increasing
in b. In this case, it is easy to see that βΓ(a, b, x̄) > 1 when b is high enough.
We now prove that βF ′(S∗) > 1 when a or b is high enough. As in proof of point (ii) of





























































≤ F (S∗) ≤ max(Ac(S
∗)α, whAhS
αh).
We prove that S∗ tends to zero when a or b goes to infinity. Indeed, let, for example, b tend
to infinity. If lim infb→∞ S
































where b is high enough, a contradiction.
So, when a or b is high enough, S∗ is low enough and hence βF ′(S∗) > 1 since F ′(0) = ∞.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 6.
According to Lemma 10, we have βD+G(S) > 1 ∀S > 0 when a and b are high enough.
Applying Proposition A3, we have lim
t→∞
St = ∞. According to Lemma 9, we obtain point 2
of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 7. We observe that













Smax(α+σ,αh) if S ≥ 1.
By using max(α+σ, αh) < 1, it is easy to prove that St is bounded from above (see Proposition
A2). Since it is monotonic, it must converge to a finite value, say Sd. According to Corollary
1, we have βD−G(Sd) ≥ 1 ≥ βD
+G(Sd).
If Sd < S
∗, then G is differentiable at Sd and βG
′(Sd) = 1 = βF
′(Sb) which in turn
implies that Sd = Sb.
If Sd > S
∗, then G is differentiable at Sd and βF
′(Sb) = 1 = βG
′(Sd) > βF
′(Sd) which
in turn implies that Sd > Sb (because F
′(S) is decreasing).
If Sd = S
∗, then we have βF ′(Sd) = βD
−G(Sd) ≥ 1 ≥ βD
+G(Sd) ≥ βF
′(Sd). So,
S = S∗ = Sb.
To sum up, we have Sd ≥ Sb. Since X0 < Sb, we have S1 < Sb ≤ S. Hence St is increasing
in t. Moreover, when a and b are high enough, we have Sb > S
∗. In this case, we must have
Sd > Sb.
C.2 Evidence from developing countries: Descriptive statis-
tics
To create variables at constant prices, we extract GDP per capita (PPP, at 2017 international
US$), GDP at current US$, and Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP from the World
Development Indicators (WDI, https://databank.worldbank.org) database, inward FDI
stock at current US$ from the United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD, https://unctadstat.unctad.org) database, and investment in R&D (as % of GDP)
from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS, http://data.uis.unesco.org).
Descriptive statistics of covariates used in this study are shown in Table C1, and Table
1, list of countries.
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Table C1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample
Investment in R&D (as % of GDP) 0.442 0.363 0.015 2.145
Physical capital (as % of GDP) 22.513 6.479 6.225 57.412
Inward FDI stock (as % of GDP) 0.349 0.307 0 2.513
UMI economies
Investment in R&D (as % of GDP) 0.506 0.391 0.015 2.145
Physical capital (as % of GDP) 22.665 6.594 9.301 57.412
Inward FDI stock (as % of GDP) 0.324 0.224 0 1.204
LMI economies
Investment in R&D (as % of GDP) 0.353 0.269 0.034 1.113
Physical capital (as % of GDP) 22.611 6.210 12.673 48.182
Inward FDI stock (as % of GDP) 0.483 0.463 0.067 2.513
Low income economies
Investment in R&D (as % of GDP) 0.176 0.098 0.015 0.476
Physical capital (as % of GDP) 20.980 6.208 6.225 37.657
Inward FDI stock (as % of GDP) 0.154 0.132 0.007 0.491
Table C2: Liste of developing countries
ARG - Argentina GTM - Guatemala NIC - Nicaragua
ARM - Armenia HND - Honduras PAK - Pakistan
AZE - Azerbaijan IDN - Indonesia PER - Peru
BLR - Belarus KAZ - Kazakhstan RUS - Russian Federation
BOL - Bolivia KGZ - Kyrgyz Republic MYS - Malaysia
BRA - Brazil MAR - Morocco TUR - Turkey
BWA - Botswana MDG - Madagascar THA - Thailand
BFA - Burkina Faso JAM - Jamaica PRY - Paraguay
BDI - Burundi NPL - Nepal PHL - Philippines
BGR - Bulgaria MDA - Moldova TUN - Tunisia
BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina ROU - Romania UGA - Uganda
CHN - China MKD - North Macedonia LKA - Sri Lanka
CRI - Costa Rica MEX - Mexico VEN - Venezuela
ECU - Ecuador MNG - Mongolia MDV - Maldives
SLV - El Salvador IRQ - Iraq SRB - Serbia
GAB - Gabon MNE - Montenegro UKR - Ukraine
GEO - Georgia MUS - Mauritius ZAF - South Africa
TJK - Tajikistan UZB - Uzbekistan
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